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Judgment for Federalism:
A Case for why the Right of Publicity should be a Federal Right
Introduction
The purpose of the right of publicity is to provide all individuals the right to control the
commercial use of their attributes such as likeness, image or name. This state-based right is
primarily concerned with protecting celebrities, hereinafter referred to as “personalities.” 1 As
the right gained more recognition from courts and legislatures in the last 25 years, its value to
personalities increased substantially. Sport, entertainment and public figures, like Tiger
Woods, Bill Clinton and Woody Allen, make millions of dollars2 from endorsements,
speaking engagements, and right of publicity claims. Personalities are also taking advantage
of the wide variation in right of publicity laws to bring claims based on a perception of
infringement.
Significant variation in state laws and judicial interpretations has proven problematic.
Thus, one must ask, does this state-based right of publicity scheme demand a federal right of
publicity statute? The answer to that question is “yes” for the following reasons. First, lack
of uniformity among state laws causes uncertainty regarding the right’s scope and limitation,
and proper forum. Second, the right of publicity conflicts with other intellectual property
1

IND. CODE § 32-36-1-6 (2002): “Personality” defined. “As used in this chapter, “personality” means a living or
deceased natural person whose [protected attribute] has commercial value, whether or not the person uses or
authorizes the use of the person’s rights of publicity for a commercial purpose during the person’s lifetime.”
2
Lauren Streib, How Celebrities Make Their Millions, FORBES.COM, (June 3, 2009, 6:00 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/2009/06/03/forbes-100-celebrity-09-earnings-paycheck-millions.html (last visited Apr.
24, 2012). Kevin Spak, Clinton Speech Income Passes $75M Mark: Last Year Was His Most Lucrative Ever,
NEWSER.COM (Jul. 12, 2011, 3:19 PM), http://www.newser.com/story/123246/bill-clinton-has-earned-75-millionfrom-speeches-over-last-decade.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2012). Woody Allen settles American Apparel
infringement for $5 million, RightofPublicity.com (May 19, 2009), http://rightofpublicity.com/woody-allensettles-american-apparel-infringement-for-5million-51809 (last visited Apr. 25, 2012).
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laws like copyright and trademark. Thirdly, some states have overprotected the right by
protecting a personality’s gesture, distinctive appearance or object like a sports car, and by
granting postmortem rights of publicity, retroactively.
This paper examines these issues and proposes that a federal statute be implemented to
limit the right of publicity. Part I of this paper provides a brief background of the right of
publicity’s origin, underlying policy and current state. Part II examines the problems with
the right of publicity by focusing on differences among state laws, copyright implications in
chosen cases, and the expansion of personality rights. Section III examines arguments for
and against a federal right of publicity statute. Section IV concludes that a federal statute is
necessary and discusses what elements should be incorporated into such a statute.
I. Background
A. Origin of the Right of Publicity
The right of publicity evolved from the right of privacy, and is a newer area of
intellectual property than other areas such as copyright and trademark. The right of privacy
is a concept generally credited to former Supreme Court Justices Louis Brandeis and Samuel
Warren, as they discussed this idea as the right to be let alone. 3 They proposed the privacy
right in an 1890 law review article,4 and it did not take long before states began adopting the
privacy right by common law or statute.5 In 1903, New York created a limited right for

3

Risa J. Weaver, Article, Online Fantasy Sports Litigation and the Need for a Federal Right of Publicity Statute,
2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 2, ¶ 5 (2010) (citing Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 202, 203 (1954).
4
Warren and Brandeis, Article, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
5
Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 202, 203 (1954).
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persons to control the commercial value in their image under its civil rights statute. 6 Soon
thereafter in 1907, New Jersey adopted the right without calling it the right of publicity.7
It was not until 1953 that the term “right of publicity” was coined in New York state in
Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.8 This case was the first time any
court clearly distinguished publicity rights from privacy rights, stating that the purpose of the
right of publicity was to protect one’s right in the commercial value of one’s photograph,
likeness or image.9 This case involved two companies claiming the right to use a baseball
player’s name. The court said that men have the exclusive right to the value of their
photographs, and the right should be called the ‘right of publicity.’

It reasoned that

prominent individuals would feel extremely deprived if corporations and businesses could
use the individual’s photographs without compensation.10
B. Purpose and Policies for the Right of Publicity
As discussed above, the right of publicity concerns who gets to exploit a personality’s
attributes.

Courts, legislatures and commentators have identified the foremost policy

underlying this right as providing an economic incentive to create works of public interest.
The United States Supreme Court in its only right of publicity case, Zacchini v. Scripps-

6

Memorandum in Opposition of Senate Bill 8373-A from the Comm. on Media (June 28, 2010), available at
http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Legislative_Memoranda_2009_20101&ContentID=43117&te
mplate=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm (last visited Mar. 23, 20112).
7
73 N.J. Eq. 136 (N.J. Ch. 1907).
8
202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
9
202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
10
Id.
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Howard Broadcasting Co,11 stated that the goals of the right of publicity were comparable to
those of copyright and patent law.
Personalities are more motivated to invest in advancing and improving their talents and
abilities when they know they are able to exclusively capitalize on the commercial value
developed in their identity (attributes).12

These investments are likely to advance the

common good because personalities will produce works that interest the public. 13 Avoiding
unjust enrichment is important, as it prevents people from free riding and commercially
benefiting from the value personalities have worked hard to build for their image.14
This policy justification is strongly related to the “moral right” policy justification for the
right of publicity. The moral right justification is based on the concept of natural rights,
including the right of one to have the right in that which one labors.15 Therefore, reaping the
benefits of one’s labor and preventing others from unjustly gaining from that labor are
important to personalities.
C. Current Law since Haelan
After the Haelan decision, other states began to establish the right of publicity in
common law, by statute or both. By the 1970s, the courts and legislatures in several states
were embracing the right of publicity. For example, California enacted a right of publicity
11

433 U.S. 562 (1977).
Jeremy T. Marr, Constitutional Restraints on State Right of Publicity Laws, 44 B.C. L. REV. 863, 875 (2003)
(citing J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy 1:3, :4 (2d ed. Rev. Mar. 2002)). See also,
Randall T.E. Coyne, Toward a Modified Fair Use Defense in Right of Publicity Cases, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV.
781, 786 (1988) (discussing the benefit of having the right of publicity).
13
Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 Calif. L. Rev.
125 (1993) (citing Simon Green, Taking Talents Serious, 2 CRITICAL REV. 202, 213 (1988)).
14
Jeremy T. Marr, Constitutional Restraints on State Right of Publicity Laws, 44 B.C. L. REV. 863, 875 (2003)
(citing J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy 1:3, :4 (2d ed. Rev. Mar. 2002)).
15
Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV.
125, 181 (1993).
12

Brittany Lee-Richardson
P a g e |9

statute in 1971.16 Six years later, the right of publicity gained widespread acknowledgement
as a result of the United States Supreme Court’s recognition of the right of publicity in
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.17 The court held that because Ohio had an
important state interest in protecting Zacchini’s incentives, its recognition of the right of
publicity did not offend Scripps-Howard’s First Amendment right.
In 1983, Michigan followed by adopting the right in common law with the Carson v.
Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.18 case. The court found that there was infringement
because the public could make an association between the phrase, “Here’s Johnny”, and the
personality, Carson. As of early 2012, thirty-one states recognize the right of publicity in
either common law, by statute or both.19 Although the interstate laws vary widely, California
and New York are where most right of publicity causes of action arise and are heard, as the
majority of American personalities are domiciled in either state.20
II.

Problems with State Right of Publicity Laws
A. Lack of Uniformity Among the States

Each state determines whether it will recognize a right of publicity and what the scope
and limits of the right will be. As a result, state laws vary greatly. Also, only thirty-one of
the fifty states recognize the right; nineteen states do not.

16

CAL. RIGHT OF PUBLICITY CIV. CODE §3344 (West 1971).
433 U.S. 562 (1977).
18
698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
19
Jonathan D. Reichman, Getting the Deal Through: Right of Publicity—United States, (Kenyon & Kenyon
LLP/New York, N.Y.), 2012, at 78, available at
http://www.kenyon.com/newspublications/publications/2011/~/media/Files/Publication%20PDFs/2011/ROP201
2%20Kenyon%20%20Kenyon.ashx (last visited Feb. 8, 2012).
20
Id.
17
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1. Right of Publicity Statutory Differences
Several of the thirty-one states have conflicting right of publicity laws. With significant
differences among states, confusion and unpredictability result. Eric Goodman, a California
intellectual property attorney and professor, agrees that it is difficult for lawyers to properly
advise clients on right of publicity matters because parties engage in forum shopping 21 for a
jurisdiction most favorable to their case. New York, California and Indiana laws are of
particular interest to personalities because New York’s right is almost in direct conflict with
the rights of California and Indiana. Although New York led in the development of the right
of publicity (discussed above)22 and is considered a major cultural and entertainment center,
its right is narrow while California’s and Indiana’s rights are broad (as discussed below).
Also, New York does not recognize a common law right of publicity, but California and
Indiana do.
a. Protected Attributes
Section 51 of the New York statute states that individuals who use one’s portrait, voice,
picture, or name for trade or advertising purposes without written authorization violates that
person’s rights.23
California, unlike New York, also protects one’s signature.24 Moreover, the types of uses
actionable under California’s statute are much more expansive than New York’s, as the

21

Krishan Thakker, The Federalism Case Against a Federal Right to Publicity, 2011 U. DENV. SPORTS & ENT.
LAW J. 97, 120 (2011) (citing Eric J. Goodman, A National Identity Crisis: The Need for a Federal Right of
Publicity Statute, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 227, 244 (1999)).
22
A New York court, in deciding Haelan Laboratories, 202 F.2d 866, coined the term “right of publicity.” This is
discussed in Part I.
23
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 2000).
24
West’s Ann. Cal. Civ. Code § 3344 (original date: 1971, amended date: 1984).
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statute prohibits use of one’s attributes, in any manner, on or in merchandise, products, or
goods, or for purposes of soliciting, advertising or selling without prior authorization.25
Indiana protects even more attributes than New York and California, including distinctive
appearance, mannerisms and gestures.26 Further, Indiana is the only state that applies its right
of publicity statute to residents and non-residents as long as the infringement occurred in
Indiana.27
b. Postmortem Rights28
The recognition of a postmortem right of publicity turns on whether the state treats it as a
property right because personal rights are not descendible. Some states, such as California
and Indiana, regard the right of publicity as a property right, and therefore, allow it to
descend.29,30 Utah requires the personality to commercially exploit his persona during his
lifetime in order for the right of publicity to descend,31 and appears to be the only state with
this requirement.32 Other states, such as New York and Wisconsin, regard the right of
publicity as a personal right.33,34

25

Id.
IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-6 (2002).
27
IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-1 (2002). See also Experience Hendrix, L.L.C., et al. v. Hendrixlicensing.com, Ltd,
et al., No. C09-285Z (W.D. Wash. Feb. 8, 2011).
28
“Descendible” and “postmortem” right of publicity are used interchangeably to refer to the right surviving after
the personality has died.
29
CAL. RIGHT OF PUBLICITY CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West 1971) (amended 2008).
30
IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-16 (2002).
31
Jonathan D. Reichman, Getting the Deal Through: Right of Publicity—United States, (Kenyon & Kenyon
LLP/New York, N.Y.), 2012, at 80, available at
http://www.kenyon.com/newspublications/publications/2011/~/media/Files/Publication%20PDFs/2011/ROP201
2%20Kenyon%20%20Kenyon.ashx (last visited Feb. 8, 2012).
32
Laura Lee Stapleton and Matt McMurphy, The Professional Athlete’s Right of Publicity, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.
REV. 23, 65 (1999) (citing J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks & Unfair Competition 28:45, at 28-57
(1996)).
33
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 2000).
34
WIS STAT. § 895.50 (West 2000).
26
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For those states that allow publicity rights to descend, the duration of the postmortem
right varies significantly. Virginia’s descendible right of publicity only lasts twenty years
after the personality’s death while California’s lasts seventy years and Indiana’s and
Oklahoma’s both last 100 years.35 Other states have different terms of duration depending on
various factors. For example, Washington’s descendible right lasts ten years if the person’s
attribute does not have commercial value and seventy-five years if it does have commercial
value,36 whereas Tennessee allows the right to continue indefinitely as long as the deceased
personality’s attributes are continually exploited.37
i.

States Amend Postmortem Rights

In two 2007 cases involving Marilyn Monroe’s postmortem right of publicity, both
federal district courts reached the same decision. In the New York decision in Shaw Family
Archives Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc.,38 and the California decision in Milton H. Greene
Archives, Inc. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc.39 the courts ruled that Monroe’s rights terminated at
death whether she was domiciled in New York or California. The courts based their rulings
on the fact that New York does not recognize a postmortem right of publicity and that
Monroe died before California passed its Celebrity Rights Act in 1985.
In response to both federal courts’ rulings, California amended its 1985 right of publicity
law (section 3344.1)40 to grant a retroactive right of publicity to deceased personalities with a
date of death on or after January 1, 1915. As a result of this amendment, the Central District
35

VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (1950). CAL. RIGHT OF PUBLICITY CIV. CODE §3344 (West 1971) (amended 2008).
IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-8 (West 2002). OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §1449 (West 1998).
36
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 63.60.040 (West 1998).
37
TENN. CODE ANN. §45-25-1104 (West 1988).
38
486 F.Supp.2d 309 (S.D.N.Y., 2007).
39
568 F. Supp.2d 1152 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
40
CAL. RIGHT OF PUBLICITY CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (2008).
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Court of California granted CMG World’s motion for reconsideration and held that the
amended statute would apply in Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. CMG World, Inc.,41 if
Monroe was domiciled in California at the time of her death.
The 2008 Washington State Legislature followed suit, revising its Washington
Personality Rights Act42 to protect the postmortem rights of publicity of individuals or
personalities no matter where they are domiciled at the time of death.43 The district court,
however, held in Experience Hendrix, L.L.C., et al., v. Hendrixlicensing.com, Ltd, et al.,44
that Washington’s statute violated the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses of the
United States Constitution as well as the so-called “dormant commerce clause.”45 Therefore,
the law of the state where a personality was domiciled at the time of death applies. 46
ii.

Indiana Expanded Postmortem Rights

Many states apply the statute of the state of domicile at the time of a personality’s
death.47 Indiana, however, applies its postmortem right of publicity law to those personalities
not domiciled in Indiana at the time of death.48 Indiana’s statute provides that regardless of
domicile, residence, or citizenship, no one may use a personality’s right of publicity

41

Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. CMG World, Inc., 568 F. Supp.2d 1152 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
Lewis R. Clayton, Expert Analysis, Right of Publicity, Trademark Dilution, Considering Copyright in
Gardens, 245 N.Y. L.J 1, Mar. 9, 2011, available at http://www.paulweiss.com/files/Publication/850ca480-c0e84797-87cd-1cb6855d60f8/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/3ba135f8-16a9-4510-b4f421d875d3feee/9Mar11IPL.pdf (last visited Feb. 2012).
43
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 63.60.010: Property right—Use of name, voice, signature, photography, or likeness
(2008).
44
Experience Hendrix, L.L.C., et al. v. Hendrixlicensing.com, Ltd, et al., No. 09-285Z at 30 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 8,
2011).
45
Clayton, supra note 42 (quoting Healy v. Beer Inst. Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989)).
46
Experience Hendrix, L.L.C., et al. v. Hendrixlicensing.com, Ltd, et al., Order No. 09-285Z (W.D. Wash. Feb.
8, 2011).
47
Id.
48
Clayton, supra note 42.
42
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commercially without consent for a period of 100 years after the death of such person, unless
the personality49 dies intestate with no surviving heirs.50
2. Different Jurisdictions Interpret Similar Cases Differently
Facenda v. NFL, Films, Inc.,51 and The Romantics v. Activision Publishing, Inc.,52 both
decided in 2008, are two similar cases with different outcomes based on jurisdiction.
In Facenda, a Philadelphia broadcaster well-known for his distinctive voice, John Facenda,
worked with and provided his voice for many of NFL Films’ productions. Several years after
Facenda’s death, NFL Films used samplings of Facenda's voice from its copyrighted sound
recordings in a television production called “The Making of Madden NFL 06” to promote the
"Madden NFL 06” football video game.

The Facenda estate brought several claims,

including infringement of Facenda’s right of publicity, against NFL Films.
The district court granted summary judgment to Facenda’s estate on the right of publicity
claim. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court applied the twoprong copyright preemption test53 to determine if federal copyright law preempted Facenda’s
estate right of publicity claim under Pennsylvania law. The court found that the state law
cause of action was not equivalent to an exclusive right under the Copyright Act because

49

IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-6 (2002): “Personality” defined. “As used in this chapter, “personality” means a
living or deceased natural person whose: (1) name; (2) voice; (3) signature; (4) photograph; (5) image; (6)
likeness; (7) distinctive appearance; (8) gesture; or (9) mannerisms; has commercial value, whether or not the
person uses or authorizes the use of the person’s rights of publicity for a commercial purpose during the person’s
lifetime.
50
IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-8: Use of personality’s right of publicity (2002).
51
542 F.3d 1007 (3rd Cir. 2008).
52
532 F. Supp. 2d 884 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
53
The Copyright Act preempts state laws that conflict with the exclusive rights provided to works of authorship
that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by
sections 102 and 103.
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Pennsylvania’s right-of-publicity statute required a showing of commercial value, which was
an additional element that copyright law did not require.54
The Second Circuit defined an additional element in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enterprises,55 stating that if a state law violation is predicated upon an act
incorporating elements beyond reproduction, the rights involved are not equivalent. 56 As for
the second prong of the copyright preemption test, the court found that Facenda’s voice did
not fall within the subject matter of copyright. Thus using the Second Circuit’s definition of
an additional element, the Third Circuit held that Pennsylvania’s right of publicity statute, as
applied to Facenda’s voice, did not conflict with and cannot be preempted by copyright law. 57
In The Romantics v. Activision Publishing, which was decided by the Eastern District
Court of Michigan, the outcome was different from the Facenda v. NFL, Films, Inc. case. In
this case, The Romantics, a rock band, wrote and recorded a song titled “What I Like About
You” in 1979. Several years later, Activision Publishing, a company that makes and sells
video games,58 and its subsidiary, RedOctane, created the video game “Guitar Hero Encore:
Rock’s the 80s” (“Guitar Hero”). RedOctane had a license from the copyright owner, EMI
Entertainment World, Inc. for the song “What I Like About You.” The license allowed
RedOctane to use the composition of the song to make a revised recording and use it with
visual images in the Guitar Hero video game.

54

The issue of copyright and right of publicity conflict and preemption is discussed in Section B of this Part.
723 F.2d 195, 204 (2d Cir. 1983).
56
Id.
57
542 F.3d 1007 (3rd Cir. 2008).
58
532 F. Supp.2d 884 (E.D. Mich., 2008).
55
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The Romantics sought a preliminary injunction to restrain Activision Publishing from
offering or selling the Guitar Hero video game.

The Romantics claimed Activision

Publishing and RedOctane violated their right of publicity by recording a newer version of
their song, “What I Like About You,” and using it in the Guitar Hero video game,59 which
carried the subtitle “as made famous by the Romantics.” The court held that The Romantics
did not establish that their right of publicity claim would succeed on the merits because
“Michigan has never recognized right of publicity in the sound of a voice, even if distinctive,
nor has it recognized a right of publicity for a combination of voices…” 60 The court also
stated that the Copyright Act preempted the right of publicity claim. The court applied the
copyright preemption two-prong test and found that The Romantics’ right of publicity claims
to the sound of the song, “What I Like About You,” fell within the subject matter of the
Copyright Act because The Romantics’ claims were based on the licensing of a copyrighted
work. The court also found that the rights claimed by The Romantics were equivalent to the
rights protected by the Copyright Act.
These two cases highlight that the application of the copyright preemption test in similar
cases vary by jurisdiction. Pennsylvania’s right of publicity recognizes one’s voice as a
protectable attribute while Michigan’s does not. Although in both instances the voice was
fixed in a copyrighted work, the court in Facenda focused on the attribute and not the
copyrighted work, whereas the court in The Romantics focused on the copyrighted work.

59
60

Id.
Id. at 888.
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3. Same Jurisdiction Interprets Similar Cases Differently
Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch61 and Laws v. Sony Music Entertainment, Inc.62 are two
similar cases heard in the same jurisdiction with different holdings. These two cases were
both heard in the Ninth Circuit within five years of each other.
In Downing, George Downing, a former surfer, and other individuals filed suit against
Abercrombie & Fitch, a specialty retailer, for infringement of their right of publicity. In
1965, Downing competed in an international surfing championship, which was filmed by
Photographer Leroy Grannis. Years later in 1999, Abercrombie obtained a copyright license
for some of Grannis’ photographs of the surfing championship to support the surfing theme
for its upcoming “Abercrombie and Fitch Quarterly,” (“Quarterly”). The Quarterly featured
the photograph of the surfers, on which Grannis had written the names of the surfers. On the
adjacent page, Abercrombie advertised tee-shirts similar to those worn by the surfers in the
photograph.
The court rejected Abercrombie’s copyright preemption argument and found that
Abercrombie used the photograph to promote its Quarterly’s surf theme although there was
no information in the catalog stating that the individuals in the photo endorsed or promoted
Abercrombie or its products. The court stated that the publication of the photograph itself
was not the issue, but rather, the use of Downing and the other surfers’ likenesses and names
pictured in the published photograph was the issue.

61
62

265 F.3d 994 (9th 2001).
448 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2006).
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Using Nimmer’s treatise on copyright law,63 the court held that although the surfers’
likenesses and names are fixed in a copyrighted photograph, the publicity rights asserted are
not the subject matter of or equivalent to those protected under copyright law. Therefore, the
right of publicity claim was not preempted by the Copyright Act.
The Laws v. Sony Music Entertainment, Inc.64 case is similar to Downing, but reaches a
different result. In Laws, a professional singer, plaintiff Debra Laws, along with Spirit
Productions, a recording company, made an agreement with Elektra and Asylum Records to
create master recordings of plaintiff’s vocal performances for Elektra.

The agreement

granted Elektra an exclusive license to the master recordings. Further, Elektra obtained the
right to use and allow others to make use of the personality’s likeness, name and other
identifying attributes in association with the master recordings. Elektra agreed to obtain
written consent from plaintiff Laws before using or authorizing others to sell records
embodying the master recordings.
Years later, Elektra’s agent entered an agreement with Sony Music Entertainment Inc. to
permit Sony a “non-exclusive license” to use a sample of plaintiff Laws’ recording of “Very
Special” in a song to be performed by other recording artists. The copyright owner, Elektra,
did not receive permission from Spirit or plaintiff Laws prior to releasing the video and disc,
and neither Spirit nor plaintiff Laws received compensation for the release. Sony then

63

Nimmer on Copyright §1.01[B][1][c] at 1-23 (1999), [T]he “work” that is the subject matter of the right of
publicity is the persona. A persona can hardly be said to constitute a “writing” of an “author” within the meaning
the copyright clause of the Constitution. A fortiori it is not a “work of authorship” under the Act. Such name or
likeness does not become a work of authorship simply because it is embodied in a copyrightable work such as a
photograph.
64
Id.
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published a disc and music video, which integrated short samples of “Very Special” into the
recording of “All I Have.”
Plaintiff Laws brought a right of publicity claim against Sony for infringement. The
court found that Laws’ action did not concern her name or image, but concerned the
copyrightable work itself. The court stated that Sony licensed the use of plaintiff Laws’
actual sound recording and incorporated the sound recording of Laws singing her song into
the “All I Have” song produced by Sony. While Laws argued that Sony misappropriated her
voice, the court said Sony had a license and right to use her sound recording, and that fact
made the Laws case an issue of copyright and not an issue of right of publicity. According to
the court, using a recording of Laws’ voice is different than licensing a song and having
someone imitate the singer’s voice who sang the song like in Midler v. Ford Motor Co.65
The court also found that the right plaintiff Laws claimed was comparable to the right
granted in Section 106 of the Copyright Act;66 thus, the court held that plaintiff Laws’ right
of publicity claims were preempted by copyright.
These two cases highlight how the applications of the copyright preemption test vary
within a jurisdiction. California’s right of publicity law protects voice, name, signatures and
images, but the Ninth Circuit ruled differently on these cases. In Downing, the court focused
on the attributes, whereas in Laws, it focused on the copyrighted work, which is the sound
recording embodying the plaintiff’s voice.
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849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). The case is discussed in Section D of this Part.
17 U.S.C.A § 106 (1976): Exclusive rights in copyrighted works. “…the owner of copyright under this title has
the exclusive rights to do and to authorize…to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.”
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B. Conflict between Right of Publicity and Copyright
The purpose of the right of publicity is similar to that of copyright. They both protect
artists and encourage creativity. 67

However, the right of publicity, which only started

receiving recognition in 1953, conflicts directly and indirectly with copyright law. These
conflicts are problematic because not all courts conduct the appropriate analysis or apply the
copyright preemption test consistently to determine if the state law right of publicity claim is
preempted by the Copyright Act when a conflict exists. Those courts that do conduct the
appropriate analysis do not apply it uniformly, thereby reaching different conclusions.
Therefore, copyrights are devalued when courts do not consistently and uniformly apply
copyright preemption to protect the rights of copyright owners and licensees.68
Courts must consider federal preemption when deciding state cases. Section 301 of the
Copyright Act specifically states that: “all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any
of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright . . . and come within the subject
matter of copyright…are governed exclusively by this title.”69
The Laws v. Sony Music Entertainment, Inc. case (discussed above) is an example of the
court properly applying section 301 because the right of publicity cannot be used to interfere
with the copyright holder or licensee’s right to use the copyrighted work in a manner
consistent with the Copyright Act. Section 301 is applied when state law claims, such as the
right of publicity, attempt to protect equitable or legal rights that are equivalent to the
exclusive rights already protected under Section 106 of the Copyright Act and where the state
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Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 199 (2002).
Laws v. Sony Music Entertainment, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 718 (9th Cir. 1970)).
69
17 U.S.C.A. § 301 (1998).
68
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law claim is being applied to work that qualifies as a work protected under Sections 102 and
103 of the copyright law.70
The work in question in Laws was a vocal performance, which was entirely incorporated
into a copyrighted medium, a sound recording;71 therefore, it satisfied the “subject matter”
part of the test. The claim also satisfied the “equivalency” part of the test because plaintiff
Laws argued that she had the right to reproduce her sound recordings. The right to reproduce
a copyrighted work is a right provided by the Copyright Act.72 Plaintiff Laws further argued
that her claim was not equivalent to rights provided under copyright law because her claim
had an extra element, commercial exploitation. The court disposed of her argument by
holding that the mere existence of an extra element does not suffice to significantly
distinguish plaintiff Laws’ right of publicity claim from a copyright claim. 73 By finding that
the state law claim fell within the same subject matter and had an equivalent right as
protected by copyright law, the Laws court properly applied section 301 preemption.
Though the copyright law seems clear, there are several examples that demonstrate that
courts inconsistently or improperly apply section 301. Two examples where the courts
improperly applied section 301 are discussed below.
1. Wendt v. Host International74
The Wendt v. Host International case decided by the Ninth Circuit in 1997 is a good
example of the conflict between copyright law and the right of publicity. Host, a company
70

GREGORY J. BATTERSBY AND CHARLES W. GRIMES, Trademark & Copyright Disputes: Litigation Forms and
Analysis § 3.03B (2003).
71
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7).
72
17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
73
448 F.3d 1134, 1144 (2006).
74
125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997).
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that provides shops and restaurants in airports, wanted to start a chain of bars in airports
based on the television show “Cheers.” The company licensed the Cheers’ characters from
Paramount Pictures, the copyright owner. The company created animatronic robots for the
restaurants based on the two star characters from the show, Norm and Cliff, played by
George Wendt and John Ratzenberger. Wendt and Ratzenberger then sued Host International
for infringement of their rights of publicity.
After comparing photos of Wendt and Ratzenberger to those of the animatronic robots,
the district court ruled that there was no likeness and granted Host’s motion for summary
judgment on the right of publicity claim. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s
ruling, holding that there was an issue of material fact concerning the degree of likeness
between the robots and Wendt and Ratzenberger.
The Ninth Circuit went on to state that they wanted to make it clear from the onset that
the case at hand was not a preemption case.75 The court quoted Congress, stating that
plaintiffs' claims are not preempted by the federal copyright statute so long as they "contain
elements, such as the invasion of personal rights...that are different in kind from copyright
infringement."76 Although the California statute does not provide such protection, the court
used the conflict between California’s statutory and common law right of publicity to support
the decision. The court stated that under the common law Wendt may be able to use the right
of publicity to claim the characters that are owned by the copyright owner. Thus, the court
held that the robots were not so different from the characters in the show that a jury could not
find that Host infringed the actors’ rights of publicity.
75

Id.
Wendt v. Host International I, 1995 WL 115571 at 1 (quoting Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 110 (9th
Cir. 1992)).
76
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This holding is a good example of the conflict between copyright and the right of
publicity. Copyright permits one, who has licensed the right or owns the copyright, to make
a derivative work from the original work,77 and the Wendt decision did not hold that
copyright preempted the actors’ rights of publicity.

Instead, the Wendt decision has

effectively allowed the right of publicity to take away the right to produce derivative works, a
right indirectly granted by copyright law.78 While under certain circumstances laws can be
made to limit derivative works of some works, the right of publicity does not rise to this level
of importance and necessity to interfere with any part of the federal copyright law.
Judge Alex Kozinski dissented and criticized the way the majority favored the right of
publicity over federal copyright law.

Judge Kozinski, who also dissented in White v.

Samsung Electronics79 (discussed below),80 was bothered more by the result of the Wendt
case than he was in the White case because Host International did obtain a license, which
permitted it to use the “Cheers” copyrights. He stated that the Wendt decision is the result of
the “sweeping standard” the court adopted in the White case.81
In Wendt, the court allowed the right of publicity to outweigh copyright law. The public
and copyright holders are harmed and perplexed when courts choose to expand the right of
publicity rather than find in favor of the copyright owner or licensee, especially since
copyright is a federal law. As a result, the right of publicity is reducing the significance of
federal law, specifically copyright law.

77

17 U.S.C.A § 106 (1976): Exclusive rights in copyrighted works. “…the owner of copyright under this title has
the exclusive rights to do and to authorize…to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.”
78
Id.
79
971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1997).
80
White v. Samsung Electronics, 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1997) is discussed in Section D of this Part.
81
Wendt v. Host International, Inc., 197 F.3d at 1284, 1286 (1999).
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2. James Brown v. ACMI Pop Division82
In 2007, the Illinois Court of Appeals held that Brown’s right of publicity claims were
not preempted by the Copyright Act. Corbis, a stock photography agency and copyright
owner and licensee, offered more than 2.1 million photographs and images for licensing on
its website. The Corbis collection included photographs of James Brown, a famous singer
and musician. Brown brought a right of publicity infringement claim in Illinois 83 against
Corbis for using his image on the Internet without permission.84
While Corbis did not use or sell Brown’s images or use his images to advertise or sell a
product, the agency did offer to license particular rights granted by copyright law. The trial
court held that Corbis was marketing a “product” to earn revenue and because Brown did not
receive compensation from the unauthorized commercial use, his publicity rights were
violated.
The Illinois trial court relied on the Seventh Circuit decision in Toney v. L'Oreal USA,
Inc.,85 to determine if the Copyright Act preempted Brown’s right of publicity claims. In
Toney,86 the court focused on Toney’s likeness and not the copyrighted photograph, stating
that the likeness of Toney was not "fixed in a tangible medium of expression" and that the
state publicity rights are not "equivalent" to any of the Copyright Act exclusive rights.

82

Brown v. ACMI Pop Division, 873 N.E.2d 954 (2007).
765 ILCS 1075/10: Recognition of right of publicity (1999). “The right to control and to choose whether and
how to use an individual’s identity for commercial purposes is recognized as each individual’s right of
publicity.”
84
Brown, 873 N.E.2d at 955.
85
406 F.3d 905 (7th Cir. 2005).
86
Id.: This case concerns a model who consented to use of her picture for the defendant’s hair packaging
products for a contracted period of time; however, the defendant continued use her picture on the company’s
products beyond the agreed period.
83
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Although Corbis argued that the Ninth Circuit ruling in Laws87 (discussed above) was
applicable and not Toney, the appeals court affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The appeals
court found that although it is likely that the photos as displayed on Corbis' Internet Web
page would be interpreted as tangible, the Publicity Act as applied in this case is not
preempted by copyright law because the display of the photos of Brown on the web page
constituted an improper commercial use under the Illinois common law or the Publicity
Act.88
C. Inconsistent Application of Copyright Preemption
Several negative effects result when the two-part copyright preemption test is not applied
or is applied incorrectly. The Copyright Act is a federal statute; therefore, it preempts
conflicting state statutes. In the last fifteen years, various courts, especially the Ninth Circuit,
have held that the right of publicity supersedes the Act’s preemption provision. These courts
have, thus, effectively created an exception to copyright preemption, and this exception
restricts copyright holders’ from fully exploiting their copyrights. 89 Several courts that do
not hold that copyright preempts the right of publicity when they should further diminish the
value and incentive provided by copyright law.
For example, the Third Circuit appears to have relied heavily on copyright expert,
Melville Nimmer, to determine if a right of publicity claim was preempted by copyright in
the Facenda case (discussed above).90 Nimmer proposed that if the primary use of the
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Laws, 448 F.3d at 1142 where Ninth Circuit distinguished its decision from Toney, 406 F.3d 905, stating that
plaintiff claimed misappropriation of her identity was separate and apart from the any copyrighted work.
88
Brown, 873 N.E.2d 955.
89
P. Stephen Fardy, Feet of Clay: How the Right of Publicity Exception Undermines Copyright Act Preemption,
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 443, 444 (2004).
90
Facenda v. NFL, Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007 (2008). The case is discussed in section A of this Part.
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copyright is for commercial advertising then it should not preempt the right of publicity
claim.91 The court held that NFL Films’ twenty-two minute television production, which
included Facenda’s voice, was promotional; thus, NFL Films’ copyright did not preempt the
Estate right of publicity claim. Both the literal reading of the statute and the Nimmer test,
however, fail to address the fundamental question of when state protection does conflict with
federal policy.92 Also, Nimmer’s proposal does not promote the goals and objectives for
creative expression.93
Nimmer’s proposal is problematic because it conflicts with the Constitutional goals of
copyright law. First, it does not foster a uniform copyright system, and a uniform copyright
system among the states is something the authors of the Copyright Act of 1976 specifically
sought to have.94 Nimmer’s proposal does not foster a uniform copyright system because it
suggests that courts base preemption on the personality’s contract with an advertiser, which
leaves a lot open to interpretation.95 Leaving so much open to interpretation can lead to
inconsistencies among the courts.96
When courts fail to hold that copyright law preempts a right of publicity claim when it
actually does, as shown above, copyright holders, licensees and the public are harmed.
Copyright holders could lose out on licensing fees because the incentive the Copyright Act
provides, ownership of exclusive rights for a specified length of time, is dwindling.
Licensees will be harmed if they license a work to produce a derivative of the work, but then
91

Id.
Christopher Pesce, Note, The Likeness Monster: Should the Right of Publicity Protect Against Imitation?, 65
N.Y.U.L. REV. 782 (1990).
93
Kristen E. Riccard, Product Place or Pure Entertainment? Critiquing a Copyright Preemption Proposal, 59
AM. U. L. REV. 427, 451 (2009).
94
Id. (citing Joseph P. Bauer, Addressing the Incoherency of the Preemption Provision of the Copyright Act
1976, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 2 (2007)).
95
Id.
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Id.
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lose a case regarding the right of publicity in the work. The money they have invested, as
well as expected future earnings from the derivative work, would be lost. Suffering this type
of loss will discourage licensees from licensing copyrighted works, thereby depriving the
public of new creative works and entertainment.
Copyright protects derivative works.97 Therefore, copyright law permits the owner of a
copy, lawfully obtained, to publicly display the work without having to ask permission of the
copyright owner.98 This right is devalued if courts do not hold that copyright law preempts
the right of publicity.
D. Overprotection
As discussed above,99 the right of publicity originally protected a personality’s right to
her likeness, image or name. The right has expanded far beyond those attributes, leading to
overprotection. Overprotection occurs when the right of publicity 1) protects more attributes
than necessary to accomplish the purpose and policies underlying the right or 2) conflicts
with other intellectual property rights like copyright. As noted in part I, the primary policy
reason underlying the right of publicity is an economic incentive for personalities to perform
or create works of interest to the public.100 Expanding the right to protect common phrases
and intangibles such as ‘evoking an image’ provides no notice to the public as to what is or is

97

Library of Congress, Copyright Registration for Derivative Works, CIRCULAR 14, available at
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ14.pdf.
98
Id. at 216. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(c) states that “the owner of a particular copy lawfully made under this title…is
entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to display that copy publicly . . . .”
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/17/109 (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).
99
What right of publicity originally protected is discussed in Part I.
100
William M. Heberer III, Comment, The Overprotection of Celebrity: A Comment on White v. Samsung
Electronics America, Inc., 22 Hofstra L. Rev. 729, 746 (1994).
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not protected.

These kinds of expansions put the public at the whim of personalities,

resulting in a “chilling effect on commercial innovation and opportunity.” 101
The purpose of protecting a personality’s right for the ultimate benefit of the public is no
longer fulfilled when the right is expanded to the point that it diminishes the public domain
and expressive work. Because not all states adhere to the underlying policy rationale, the
purpose and policies are no longer the focus of state legislatures and courts. Even when there
is a state statute, the courts look to common law to find or create an attribute. Expanding the
right of publicity as they have in the following federal circuit cases overprotects a
personality’s right.
1. Courts’ Expansion of Protection
a. Relates to Fame
The Ninth Circuit decided Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,102 in 1974.
Lothar Motschenbacher, an internationally known professional race car driver, sued R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Company for misappropriating his likeness, name and personality. In
1970, Reynolds created a televised commercial that included a “stock” color photograph
portraying various race cars on a racetrack. For its commercial, Reynolds used a car similar
to that of Motschenbacher but made several changes to Motschenbacher’s car. Reynolds
changed the number from “71” to “11”, added a spoiler to the rear of the car, and added
“Winston,” the Reynolds’ product name.

Motschenbacher’s facial features were not

discernible; his distinctive red with white pinstripe car, however, appeared to be in the
101

Christopher Pesce, Note, The Likeness Monster: Should the Right of Publicity Protect Against Imitation?, 65
N.Y.U.L. REV. 782 (1990).
102
498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
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foreground of the commercial with other race cars. Some of Motschenbacher’s associates
who saw the commercial assumed it was Motschenbacher’s car and that his car was
sponsored by Winston.
The court found in favor of Motschenbacher, as it held that Reynolds appropriated
Motschenbacher’s “proprietary interest” in his identity via its commercial. The court said the
use of the various distinctive, distinguishing characteristics without authorization violated
Motschenbacher’s right of publicity. With this decision, the Ninth Circuit extended the right
of publicity to allow a personality to have exclusive rights over a type or style of car. The
court, therefore, expanded protection to encompass physical markers, not physically attached
to a personality.
The Sixth Circuit decided Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.,103 in 1983.
The host and star of “The Tonight Show,” Johnny Carson, brought a suit against the Here’s
Johnny Portable Toilets, for renting “Here’s Johnny” portable toilets.104 Each night since the
show began in 1962, Carson was introduced with the expression “Here’s Johnny.” 105 Carson
licensed the clothing company, Johnny Carson Apparel, Inc., to use his picture, name, and
“Here’s Johnny” on the company’s promotional material, in advertisements and on clothing
labels. The toilet company, however, never received a license from Carson to use the phrase,
so the court found that the company had infringed Carson’s right of publicity.
Applying Michigan’s right of publicity law, the court reasoned that anything used
without authorization in commercial advertising that conjures up an association with a

103

698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
Id.
105
Id.
104
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personality violates that personality’s right of publicity. As a result, the court held that
Carson had the right to prevent anyone from exploiting the phrase, “Here’s Johnny,”
commercially for the duration of his life. Further, his heirs or assignees could exploit
commercially the right because Michigan allows for postmortem right of publicity.
Neither Carson’s or Motschenbacher’s name or image was involved in either case. Yet,
both circuit courts saw the need to expand the right. These types of expansions exceed the
scope of the right to protect a personality from commercial exploitation. A personality is
defined as a human being; therefore, protecting the style of car a personality drives does not
comport with the policy reasons for the right of publicity, nor does protecting a generic
phrase. Protecting generic phrases or race cars do not benefit the public, as artists are not
encouraged to be creative by the protection of generic phrases, thus, this type of expansion
only harms the public.
b. Sound-Alike Performance
The Ninth Circuit decided Midler v. Ford Motor Co.,106 in 1988. In this case, Ford, a
vehicle manufacturer, hired an imitator to sing one of Entertainer Bette Midler’s songs for its
car marketing advertisement. Ford had a license to use the song and the advertisement did not
use Midler’s name or picture. Midler, a nationally known singer and actress, brought a right of
publicity claim against Ford. The Ninth Circuit found in favor of Midler and held that Ford
had infringed Midler’s right of publicity by hiring someone to imitate her voice while singing
one of her songs.

106

849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1998).
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The Ninth Circuit decided Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,107 in 1992. The Waits case is another
example of the Ninth Circuit expanding the right of publicity’s protectable attributes. FritoLay, a snack food company, hired an advertising agency to produce an advertising campaign
for a new product. The agency wrote a commercial and song to echo some of the words in
Waits’ song “Step Right Up.” The agency also hired a singer to imitate Waits’ voice since
Waits, a professional singer with a deep, raspy voice, did not do commercial endorsements.
The Frito-Lay commercial premiered on over 250 radio stations in 1988. When Waits
heard it, he brought a suit against Frito-Lay and the advertising agency claiming ‘voice
misappropriation.’ The Ninth circuit coined this term in Midler in 1988. The court found
that Waits’ right of publicity was infringed because the commercial “featured a deliberate
imitation of Waits’ voice.”108 The court held that a personality could protect an individual
style of singing.
These Ninth Circuit decisions expanded the right to prevent sound-alikes and protect
styles of singing.

California’s right of publicity statute only protects the use of a

personality’s actual voice, not the imitation of a personality’s voice. Therefore, the district
court in Midler found that there was “no legal principle preventing imitation.”109 Although
the circuit court admitted the statute did not protect imitation of a personality’s voice, it
created a ‘voice misappropriation’ tort under California common law and found that the tort
was relatable to a violation of the right of publicity. By the circuit court creating the tort and
reversing the district court’s summary judgment for Ford, the court held that imitating a
personality’s distinctive voice should be actionable under the right of publicity.
107

978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1098.
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Midler, 849 F.2d at 462.
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This type of expansion frustrates the purpose of copyright, as copyright has a goal of
preserving the public domain and preventing artists, authors and the like from protecting
ideas.

Imitations of sound recordings are allowed by the copyright sound recording

amendment.110 Instead of expanding the right of publicity in Midler, the court should have
affirmed the district court’s ruling in Midler that her right of publicity claim was preempted
by copyright and that Midler had a cause of action under the Lanham Act.111 The expansion
in Midler continued in Waits, which was also a Lanham Act cause of action.
Also, by certain jurisdictions expanding the right of publicity and other jurisdictions such
as New York, not following suit, the disparity among states is becoming even greater.
Additionally, these expansions limit future performers’ creativity, as well as the quantity and
type of works available to the public.112
c. Evokes an Image
The Ninth Circuit decided White v. Samsung Electronics113 in 1992. Four years after the
Midler decision, the Ninth Circuit further expanded publicity rights. Samsung Electronics,
an electronic company, used a robot dressed like Vanna White standing in front of a Wheel of
Fortune board in its advertisement for VCRs. White, the Wheel of Fortune game show cohost, sued Samsung for infringement of her right of publicity. Samsung argued that the ‘fair

110

17 U.S.C. §114(b) (exclusive rights of copyright owner do not extend to creation of other sound recordings
even though such sounds imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording).
111
Lanham Act section 43(a), 15 U.S.C.A § 1125(a)(1) makes it an offense to misrepresent information in a way
that is likely to deceive consumers about the origin or approval of such information.
112
Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 199, 221
(2002).
113
971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
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use’114 defense should apply because the advertisement did not include a photo of White or
her name; it simply parodied her persona.
The district court held that none of White’s protected attributes were violated based on
California law. The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed the district court and disagreed with the
‘fair use’ defense based on parody. The court further expanded the right to include ‘evoking
an image based on a role’ as a protected attribute by holding that Samsung used White’s
persona by conjuring up her image in the mind of the public.
This decision, as Judge Kozinski stated in his dissent to the denial of an en banc
review,115 extended the right of publicity much too far. He said the decision to deny review
of the case is a good example of overprotection.116

The overprotection of intellectual

property rights is just as detrimental as under-protection because of the stifling effect
overprotection has on the same creative forces it is supposed to foster. 117

Further,

California’s right of publicity statute does not protect a personality from parody. Therefore,
to correct a perceived wrong done to White, the court created law to protect an ‘evoked
image’ as an attribute. Cases in this area widen the gap between right of publicity claimants
and their true identities.118
Thus, when the Ninth Circuit in Wendt v. Host International119 (discussed above),120
decided in 1999, held that simply evoking a celebrity’s persona is sufficient to infringe the
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Black’s Law Dictionary 16(c) (9th ed. 2009): A parody is a form of critiquing or ridiculing an original work.
Parodies are “protected as free speech.” For copyright, a work is protected if it is a fair use of the original work.
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989 F.2d 1512 (1993).
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Id.
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Id. at 1513 stated Judge Alex Kozinski.
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See Jeffrey Malkan, Stolen Photographs: Personality, Publicity, and Privacy, 75 TEX. L.
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right of publicity, Judge Kozinski’s said “White’s voracious logic swallows up rights
conferred by Congress under the Copyright Act.”121 The White case is a good example of
overprotection, as it extended the right of publicity well beyond the most standard protected
attributes of the right. Judge Kozinski warned the court that, by allowing the expansion in
White, it was jeopardizing creativity by depleting the public domain122 because intellectual
property rights are supposed to only protect against particular types of appropriation. The
expansions in White and Wendt put no necessary limits on this intellectual property right like
other intellectual property rights have. The court found no derivative work in Wendt, nor any
idea-expression dichotomy or fair use exceptions in White.123
2. Personality Quest for Expansive Protection
The right of publicity, in jurisdictions like California and Indiana, has expanded to the
point that personalities think that any reference or perceived reference to them qualifies as a
violation of their right.124
a. Lindsay Lohan against E*Trade Securities, LLC125
Lindsay Lohan, an actress arrested on more than one occasion for drunk driving,126 filed a
100 million dollar lawsuit against E*Trade Securities, an investment company, for
misappropriation of her name.
120

E*Trade is famous for producing baby commercials to

Id. is discussed in section B of this Part.
Wendt, 197 F.3d 1284.
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advertise its services.127

In 2010, the investment company produced another baby

commercial, and this time one of the babies was named “Lindsay.” During the commercial,
one baby asked about the “milkaholic Lindsay” then the supposed “milkaholic Lindsay” baby
pops on screen, seemingly drunk asking “Milk-a-what?”
Although the commercial did not identify Lindsay Lohan,128 she asserted that she has
achieved single-name recognition and E*Trade used her name to sell its product. Her claim
does not meet the first element of a right of publicity claim because she is not well-known by
just her first name, ‘Lindsay,’129 nor did the advertisement use her full name or include any
images of Lohan. Unlike Oprah, Cher or Madonna, Lohan’s first name is not a brand and she
is not well known as or referred to as ‘Lindsay.’ 130 Although E*Trade’s attorneys thought
the claims were “meritless,” E*Trade settled with Lohan. 131 Because of courts’ history and
willingness to expand the right of publicity to fit the claim, one can assume that was the
reason E*Trade settled the suit.
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b. Burck v. Mars, Inc. 132
E*Trade should have looked for precedent in the Burck v. Mars decision, decided in 2008
by the district court for the Southern District of New York. In this case, Robert Burck, a
street performer, also known as the Naked Cowboy, sued Mars, a famous candy
manufacturer, for violation of his right of publicity under New York’s right of publicity
statute. Mars created a billboard and mural in New York City with M&M candies pictured as
well as ran animated cartoon advertisements. One of the candies was a blue M&M character
wearing a white cowboy hat, boots and underwear with a guitar similar to how Burck dresses.
Only the first element of New York’s three-element test was disputed, which was
whether Mars used Burck’s name, portrait, picture or voice in its advertisement. The court
equated the case to White v. Samsung133 (discussed above). The court found that using
suggestive characteristics or evoking aspects of a personality without literally using the
personality’s picture or portrait was not actionable under New York’s right of publicity
statute. Therefore, the court held that Mars did not violate Burck’s right of publicity, unlike
the Ninth circuit, which allowed White to proceed with a right of publicity claim based on a
suggestive character under common law and win.
III.

Arguments For and Against a Federal Right of Publicity Statute
A. Argument for Enacting a Federal Right of Publicity Statute

Several reasons bolster the argument for enacting a federal right of publicity statute,
including that a federal statute will reduce confusion and uncertainty; it will prevent or

132
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minimize conflicts between state right of publicity law and copyright law; it will ensure that
litigants are treated uniformly among the states; and it will reduce the incentive to engage in
forum shopping.

1. Minimize Uncertainty
The current right of publicity system’s lack of definitive boundaries has resulted in
considerable confusion among potential litigants.134 Personalities often are not sure whether
their right of publicity is protected or even what attributes are protected. 135 Defendants may
not be aware of when they can use a personality’s particular attributes. With the many
variations in states’ right of publicity laws, courts are either not applying the copyright
preemption test or are applying it inconsistently.
Additionally, by providing certainty, a federal right of publicity statute will encourage
personalities to engage in more creative and novel endeavors nationally, as the cost of
enforcing their rights would be greatly reduced.136 The personality could bring a claim
against a particular infringing company in one federal court and that decision would apply
nationally. The infringing company, therefore, would be nationally banned from committing
that infringing act, such as making a commercial including a personality’s image.
Further, as noted in the various case examples provided, right of publicity claims often
end up in federal court because right of publicity claims are often coupled with federal issues,
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which is problematic. Federal courts should not be deciding how to apply state laws that
vary so widely. A federal right of publicity would eliminate this problem.
2. Resolve Conflict
As discussed above,137 major conflict exists between the right of publicity and copyright
law, which a federal statute would resolve.
In creating the federal law, Congress would consider and address the demonstrated
conflicts between the right of publicity and copyright. Specifically, federal courts will have a
uniform federal law to apply, thus eliminating the issue of courts confusing various state laws
and reversing their own decisions when determining if a right of publicity claim is preempted
by the Copyright Act. This occurred in Toney v. L’Oreal (discussed above).138 The Seventh
Circuit reversed itself, as the district court held that Toney’s right of publicity claim was
preempted based on the Seventh Circuit’s 1986 decision in Baltimore Orioles v. Major
League Baseball Players Association139case.

However, the Seventh Circuit, found no

copyright preemption in Toney.
To reduce and possibly eliminate the conflicts, the statute could include the various
measures that do affect the right of publicity, as it did in the federal trademark law to protect
people from misrepresentations.140 By including measures to address conflicts, each court
will apply the same criteria to determine whether the right of publicity should be preempted
so that like cases, such as Facenda and The Romantics, would have similar outcomes.
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3. Reduce Compliance Cost
The current process of each state determining what attributes to protect under the right of
publicity leads to personalities and non-personalities receiving no protection to too much
protection. Forum choice directly affects many aspects of one’s right of publicity case,
including the specific rights and attributes protected. 141 As discussed above,142 depending on
the state in which the suit is brought, a particular right may or may not be protected.
For personalities to bring suit, in various states for the same infringement to ensure their
rights are not exploited, is costly and inefficient.143

Secondly, the extensive research

attorneys must conduct to decipher the laws of the various jurisdictions is burdensome and
costly. As noted, several states do not recognize the right of publicity. Thirdly, requiring
potential advertisers to research the laws of the various jurisdictions to ensure they are not
infringing a personality right of publicity is equally taxing. 144 Lastly, the concern of damages
must be addressed. If personalities could bring suit in one federal court against defendants
who have exploited commercially their attribute in multiple states, they could receive
multiple damages from the same company for the same infringement.145
Additionally, an injunction imposed by a court may only be applicable in the state where
the infringement occurred. The issue is whether an injunction granted by a court in one state
is effective over the behavior in a different state. A good example of this problem is
141

Blair Joseph Cash, “Hasta La Vista, Funny Guys”: Arnold Schwarzenegger’s Fictional Voice
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demonstrated by New York courts. New York courts have stated that New York’s right of
publicity law does not apply to infringement concerning commercial exploitation of
personalities’ attributes in other states.146
The variations in the right of publicity law among the states, according to Intellectual
Property Attorney and Professor Eric Goodman, means “Lawyers cannot give their clients
anything even resembling an unqualified opinion under the current scheme…” 147 Instituting
a federal right of publicity would eliminate these concerns, as there would be one uniform
law for each jurisdiction to follow and all decisions would apply nationwide. Personalities,
therefore, would not have to bring multiple suits, and attorneys and defendants could rely on
one governing law, which would reduce costs.
4. Eliminate Forum Shopping
Forum shopping is a method where parties seek or “shop” for jurisdictions with laws that
favor their position.148

The vast discrepancies among the states regarding the right of

publicity have created a chronic forum shopping issue.149 A federal right of publicity statute
will eliminate forum shopping because the same rights will be protected everywhere; thus, it
will not matter where the personality initiates the suit.
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The current state-based domicile-at-death rule150 does not adequately address the problem
of forum shopping. This rule only addresses cases in which a cause of action regarding the
descendible rights’ of a deceased personality should be brought. However, the preference of
a personality’s heirs is to bring right of publicity claims in jurisdictions like California,
Indiana, Oklahoma, or Tennessee, as they have the broadest right of publicity statutes.
Living personalities can choose which jurisdiction to bring a claim for right of publicity
infringement when the infringement takes place in many states.151 For example, Marilyn
Monroe’s estate sued a photography archive and licensing company in Indiana in 2005. The
estate claimed that the company violated Monroe’s postmortem right of publicity under
Indiana’s law, although Monroe lacked a connection with Indiana while she was alive.152
Another example involves California-based Bruce Lee Enterprises.

In 2009, that

company initiated suit in Indiana against a New York and New Jersey-based clothing
company, claiming that the clothing company had infringed its right of publicity under
Indiana law.153
This type of forum shopping will leave potential defendants guessing, as they will never
know ahead of time which law they may be subjected to in a right of publicity case. Having
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an attorney explain all of the possible outcomes based on what state or states a personality
may decide to bring a right of publicity suit is just not feasible as discussed above.
5. Limit Litigation
A public policy reason exists for federalizing the right of publicity. A federal statute will
reduce litigation because a judicial decision on a case for the right of publicity will apply
nationally.

Therefore, personalities will not have to bring multiple suits for the same

infringement.

Further, advertising and retail companies will know which attributes are

protected, and may stray away from using those protected attributes since they know they can
potentially use other attributes.
Personalities will not be forced to bring litigation in various jurisdictions to protect their
rights of publicity, and injunctions against particular infringing activities will apply
nationwide. It is arguable that introducing a federal statute will increase litigation because
the right of publicity would be litigated in those nineteen states that currently do not
recognize the right of publicity. This argument is weak because it fails to consider the fact
that a federal right will mean that a decision by one court on the matter will apply in all
states. Currently, personalities would have to bring approximately thirty-one

154

different

suits for the same infringing actions, whereas a single federal right of publicity will require
only one suit.
Personalities have to bring numerous suits because advertisers and retailers commercially
exploit personalities across state borders, but the current right of publicity regime does not
allow a personality to recover from or prohibit infringement by these entities by bringing suit
154
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in one jurisdiction. Personalities have to initiate suit in every state where their right of
publicity is being infringed if the state does not enforce a judgment from another state.
Therefore, while more states will hear right of publicity cases, there will be fewer right of
publicity cases overall as a personality only has to bring one right of publicity suit under a
federal right of publicity statute. Further, personalities and defendants will have a clear
understanding of what attributes are protected. The proposed federal statute, discussed
below,155 will only protect a limited number of attributes; therefore, many of the current
kinds of claims will no longer have merit.
6. Regulate Internet Infringement
Allowing states to create right of publicity laws may have made sense when the right was
in its infancy; however, this is a different time.156 With ever changing and fast-growing
technology such as the Internet, a federal right of publicity has become more and more of a
necessity. Thus, Melville Nimmer, a leading scholar on copyright, seriously doubted that the
individual state law scheme for the right of publicity adequately satisfies the demands of the
21st century Internet Age.157 With the current Internet Age, companies are confronted with
the issue of what state laws apply when they place advertisements on the Internet. The
expansive Internet use significantly increases personalities’ potential for economic loss, as
those protected attributes are typically not fixed in a tangible medium, which means they can
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be more easily appropriated and exploited without approval.158 A federal right of publicity
statute will make compliance with personalities’ rights of publicity easier, as companies will
only have to be aware of one uniform statute when they create Internet advertisements.
B. Arguments against Enacting a Federal Right of Publicity Statute
A federal statute will provide uniformity, reduce the confusion and uncertainty, prevent
or minimize copyright law and other potential federal law conflicts, and reduce the incentive
to engage in forum shopping and litigation.
Opponents of a federal right of publicity statute offer various arguments ranging from
states’ retaining autonomy to the right of publicity being a property right that states should
regulate. The following arguments and concerns will be addressed in this section: (1) the
right of publicity is a property right and property rights are state-based rights; (2) a federal
statute will force those states that do not recognize the right of publicity to recognize it; and
(3) many variations of the right of publicity exist making it difficult to determine which form
should be adopted.
1. States Should Regulate Property Rights
The strongest argument against a federal right of publicity statute is that the right of
publicity should be regulated by the state because property rights are created and regulated by
the states.159 True, states must retain autonomy, but the problems of inconsistency outweigh
those concerns. Allowing states to have deference over this law is admirable and furthers
federalism concerns, but lack of uniformity issues raise greater concerns because
158
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personalities facing the same circumstance are treated significantly different based on
jurisdiction. For example, personalities’ publicity rights are not descendible if they are
domiciled in New York at the time of death, whereas, their publicity rights are descendible if
they are domiciled in California at death.
Differences between the statutes concerning protectable attributes and postmortem rights
result in mass confusion among personalities, entities, attorneys, and courts. The significant
differences among the states regarding the right of publicity are therefore sufficient to limit
state autonomy on this matter.

Federal government regulation will eliminate lack of

uniformity issues and reduce confusion. Currently, federal statutes govern copyright and
patent laws. They are federal laws because the purpose for those laws is to promote the
progress of science and useful arts. The right of publicity should be a federal right as well, as
that appears to be the Framer’s clear intention. The Framers indicated that state regulation of
works of authorship would be inefficient. This idea is demonstrated clearly in Federalist
Paper 43 where James Madison notes that the federal law should govern intellectual property
matters.
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of
authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of
common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to
belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases with
the claims of individuals. The States cannot separately make effectual
provisions for either of the cases, and most of them have anticipated the
decision of this point, by laws passed at the instance of Congress. 160
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From this quote, it can be inferred that the Framers intended for federal law to
regulate all varied areas of intellectual property. 161
2. States Should Have the Option to Recognize a Property Right
The issue of forcing states to recognize and enforce a law they have chosen not to
adopt162 is another argument against a federal law and relates to the issue of autonomy.
While several states recognize the right of publicity, some do not, and no good reason, goes
the argument, justifies overriding those state choices.
This argument is outweighed in light of all the problems that result from not having a
federal right of publicity statute. Further, the fact that the majority of the states do recognize
some form of the right and only a few states do not strengthens the argument for a federal
right, as this demonstrates that lawmakers in general believe a right of publicity should be
recognized. The easiest way to ensure it is recognized is to enact a federal law. A federal
right of publicity would ensure all persons’ right of publicity is protected. Additionally, the
fact that some states do not recognize the right does not mean that no valid moral or
economic considerations exist for a uniform law. An important economic consideration is
the commercial value of personalities’ attributes.
The lack of a federal right of publicity means that corporations and other businesses can
diminish personalities’ commercial value and deprive them of the opportunity to make
money. Those states that fail to recognize the right, therefore, are depriving personalities in
their states of pecuniary gain because personalities should have the right to decide if and
161
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Misappropriation Lawsuit Against Comedians Imitating His Voice and the Case for a Federal Right of Publicity
Statute, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 207, 226 (2010).
162

Brittany Lee-Richardson
P a g e | 47

when their attributes will be used. Thus, states that do not recognize the right of publicity
allow companies to violate personalities’ right to their attributes and diminish the value in
those attributes.163 They should have this right because of the work and effort that they have
expended to create the commercial value in their attributes.164
3. No Methodology Exists to Determine the Best Law
Another argument concerns the issue of which form of the many variations of the law to
adopt. It is argued that competition among the states should form the uniform right, as states
will compete to have celebrities reside in their state and will adjust their laws accordingly. 165
Additionally, the right has not had sufficient time to develop.166 Allowing states to develop
and improve the right will allow the best version of the law to materialize. 167 This argument
addresses the issue that the right of publicity is not a clear right, which is actually a good
reason to enact a federal law. Also, the idea that the right is so new and has not had the
opportunity to develop is not a valid argument because the right of publicity has received
recognition since 1953; therefore, the right has had the opportunity to develop for fifty-nine
years. While it will be difficult to determine which form of the law should be enacted, it
would include looking at the scope of each law and determining if features of a law support
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the policy reasons for a right of publicity and have limits and boundaries like other federal
intellectual property laws – copyright, patent and trademark.
IV. Federal Statute
A. Federal Right of Publicity Statute should be Enacted
A federal right of publicity statute is required to provide clarity, reduce litigation,
incorporate moral and economic considerations, reduce forum shopping, and more. It is
inefficient for a business that wants to use a personality’s attribute nationally to have to know
all the various state laws and apply the most burdensome requirements to avoid liability. 168
Further, as discussed above, state right of publicity statutes are interfering with federal
intellectual property rights, particularly copyright. Also, some courts do not adequately
address copyright preemption when considering whether a right of publicity claim is valid,
which devalues copyright. Thus, a federal right of publicity is needed to eliminate these
concerns and issues.
Lastly, a federal right of publicity statute is required to prevent individual states from
affecting commerce in other states and from expanding the right of publicity so far as to
destroy its purpose and have a substantial effect on other intellectual property rights. A
federal right will improve the overall status of the right of publicity and ensure that the
public’s interest is balanced with the interests of personalities.
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B. What the Federal Statute Should Include
The federal statute should address the primary purpose of the right of publicity law. As
discussed above,169 the purposes for the right of publicity are to prevent commercial unjust
enrichment and to encourage personalities to engage in creative endeavors. Therefore, a
federal right of publicity statute will help by limiting the pool of protected attributes; thereby,
leaving broad categories such as the style of singing, a particular gesture or generic phrase in
the public domain for everyone to use and enjoy.
A federal statute should only protect the name, likeness and image of a personality (or
individual). These attributes should be protected because they most directly relate to a
person’s individuality. Further, name, image and likeness are the first attributes protected
under the privacy right and later under the right of publicity. Also, all states that recognize
the right of publicity protect these attributes; therefore, these are clearly deemed important,
protectable attributes.170 Additionally, protecting only these attributes will fulfill the primary
purpose and goals of the right of publicity, as intellectual property rights are supposed to only
protect against particular types of appropriation. These attributes are specific and will ensure
personalities can protect the value of their hard work to achieve fame and notoriety while
encouraging them to continue to perform and contribute to the public domain for the public’s
benefit.
The federal statute should also include a section on a descendible postmortem right of
publicity because it provides an additional incentive for personalities to work harder and
169
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achieve more, enriching the public domain. Personalities are more likely to do so if their
heirs can benefit from the labor they expended during their lifetimes. Further, a majority of
the states that recognize the right of publicity already recognize a postmortem right.171
Including a postmortem right is essential, as it guarantees prevention of unjust enrichment by
people who would exploit commercially the fame and notoriety personalities achieved during
their lifetime.172

Allowing corporations and businesses to exploit commercially a

personality’s attributes without permission is unjust because the personality invested and
worked to build the commercial value in their attributes so they and their families could reap
the benefits.

Including the postmortem right of publicity, therefore, will satisfy the

underlying policy for the right of publicity.
Postmortem rights of publicity should be limited in the same way copyright duration is
limited.

The same free speech and free enterprise considerations balanced in limiting

copyright duration are relevant to a descendible right of publicity. 173

Applying similar

criteria to the right of publicity’s duration as applied to determine copyright’s duration should
achieve the necessary balance between the autonomy over one’s attributes and the public’s
interest in the availability of ideas and information. 174 Further, the copyright postmortem
durational scheme can provide the legislature guidance for the postmortem right of
publicity.175
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The difficulty lies in determining the actual duration for postmortem right of publicity.
The right of publicity is different from copyright in that personalities’ commercial values
quickly and drastically decline soon after death.176 Therefore, a limited durational period,
such as ten years should be imposed,177 unless the assignees or heirs continue to
commercially exploit the attributes after the death of the personality, as the Tennessee statute
requires.
The statute should specify who is eligible to receive right of publicity protection. It
should continue with the general trend, which allows non-personalities to receive protection
along with personalities, as copyright and patent does not discriminate as to who can receive
protection for their works or inventions. This section should also include definitions, as
found in many of the state statutes, to avoid confusion. It should first define the right of
publicity. A good definition to use is that provided by Professor McCarthy, the author of
“The Rights of Publicity and Privacy.”178 That treatise provides an extensive examination of
the right of publicity and McCarthy’s right of publicity definition.179 He states the right of
publicity is “the inherent right of every human being to control the commercial use of his or
her identity.”180 Next, it should define key terms. For example, Indiana’s right of publicity
statute includes a definition of personality that implies that if one’s publicity has no
commercial value, one will not be able to recover more than nominal damages even if his
right is infringed.181 Nominal damages for non-personalities are sufficient, as they do not
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Id. (citing Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)).
Id.
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J. THOMAS, MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY (2d ed. Rev. Mar. 2002).
179
Jeremy T. Marr, Constitutional Restraints on State Right of Publicity Laws, 44 B.C. L. REV. 863, 865 (2003).
180
Id. (citing J. THOMAS, MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY 1:3, :4 (2d ed. Rev. Mar. 2002)).
181
IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-6 (2002).
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have commercial value but should be permitted to recover some damages when wronged.
Damages should also take into consideration how much the infringer benefitted.
V. Conclusion
The United States is in need of a federal right of publicity statute for several reasons,
most notably to eliminate the lack of uniformity among the states, conflicts with copyright
law, and overprotection. The lack of uniformity among the states causes several problems:
individuals are uncertain of what rights are protected, federal courts are expanding state laws,
rights of publicity litigation is increasing,182 and like cases are treated differently within and
between jurisdictions.
Right of publicity conflicts with copyright are abundant, as the right of publicity is very
similar to and often overlaps copyright, which is problematic. Many courts have held that
copyright does not preempt a right of publicity claim when they clearly should. As a result,
copyright holders, licensees and the public are harmed because these decisions devalue the
purpose of copyright law.
Finally, overprotection of publicity rights also harms the public. A goal of intellectual
property rights is to incentivize entertainers, authors, creators, and others to create appealing
works and performances. The current scheme of right of publicity laws, however, is spoiling
this purpose and appropriating the rights granted to copyright holders. The overprotection of
publicity rights is removing the same material and ideas placed in the public domain by
copyright law. The Wendt v. Host International183 case, where the court held that the actors
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Consor Intellectual Asset Management, CONSOR Intellectual Asset Management Expands its Right of
Publicity Litigation Support Services, http://www.consor.com/ip-news/consor-intellectual-asset-managementexpands-its-right-of-publicity-litigation-support-services.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).
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could lay claim to the characters they played in “Cheers” television show against the
copyright owners right to license the characters for a derivative work, is a good example.
The right of publicity as a state-based property right is ineffective. The time has come
for a federal right of publicity statute. Federal regulation will ensure uniformity among the
states, remove the conflicts between the right of publicity and copyright law, and prevent
overprotection. Federal regulation will allow right of publicity and copyright laws to coexist
for the betterment of society. Federal regulation of the right of publicity will ensure that
personalities, attorneys and businesses alike all know what constitutes right of publicity
infringement, thus, reducing litigation. Federal regulation will define the appropriate scope
for the right of publicity by drawing on copyright, trademark and patent laws to ensure that
the public domain is protected. Thus, it is now time for Congress to legislate on the matter.
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Wendt v. Host International, 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997).
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